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Over the course of the last 60 years, the international community built a weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) nonproliferation regime aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Conventions on Chemical 
and Biological Weapons are key pillars of that regime. More recent additions include such 
measures as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Proliferation Security 
Initiative. 
 
Despite the myriad of national and international measures to prevent the spread of WMD, there 
are significant problems on the horizon. Like his predecessors, President Barack Obama has 
stated unequivocally that the American people face no greater danger than a terrorist attack with 
a nuclear weapon. He has further asserted that the success in preventing terrorist acquisition of a 
WMD depends upon broad consensus of all nations. Many other world leaders have joined 
President Obama in his call to action. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* This research project was conducted in partnership with the Africa Peace Forum (AFPO). Stimson primarily 
assisted AFPO and Government of Kenya stakeholders with providing a framework for analysis by engaging with a 
wide range of border security experts from key donor states. Local actors were responsible for providing content 
from within their own area of responsibility. Over a dozen government agencies participated. Specific references 
about current capabilities and forthcoming capacity building work have been excluded due to the sensitive nature of 
this type of security capacity building. 
† This publication results from research supported by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems 
and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) via Assistance Grant/Agreement No. N00244-
13-1-0031 awarded by the NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center San Diego (NAVSUP FLC San Diego). The views 
expressed in written materials or publications, and/or made by speakers, moderators, and presenter, do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies of the Naval Postgraduate School nor does mention of trade names, 






In 2010, over 45 countries gathered at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC and 
declared that securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years would 
be paramount to global security. Despite good faith efforts since then, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to report serious incidents of diversion, theft or loss of nuclear 
and other radioactive materials. Last year alone, the IAEA’s Nuclear Incident and Trafficking 
Database (ITDB) confirmed 146 such cases. That figure included 6 instances involving 
possession and related criminal activities, 47 involving theft or loss of material, and 95 involving 
other unauthorized activities—and these are the incidents about which we are aware. 
Organizations charged with preventing the spread of chemical and biological weapons note 
similarly worrisome incidents. 
 
The continued and accelerating spread of materials associated with WMD is partly due to the 
changing proliferation environment. First, the licit and illicit trade of WMD and related materials 
is increasingly moving southward, meaning that, to a greater extent, emerging and developing 
countries are part – wittingly or unwittingly – of the WMD supply chain, as dual-use innovators 
and manufacturers, critical transshipment points and financial centers, or breeding grounds for 
terrorist sympathies (see map 1). In such a proliferation environment, absent participation by all 
countries that represent links in the global proliferation supply chain – from Southeast Asia, 
Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America – increase the probability that international efforts to 






Second, the international community has largely failed to develop a long term and sustainable 
WMD nonproliferation strategy that is suitable for emerging and developing countries. To date, 
the great majority of WMD nonproliferation programming, particularly in Africa, are seen as 





governments – in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Caribbean and Latin America – seek capacity 
building assistance and partnerships to address more critical national needs, such as improved 
border control, policing and judicial capabilities, which more directly apply to broader global 
challenges like conventional arms and drug trafficking, growing energy needs, human 
smuggling, piracy, environmental crime, public health issues and securing the supply chain to 
facilitate more efficient trade relationships with countries around the world. 
 
In recent decades, this disconnect between the Global North and South has resulted in wasted 
resources, siloed approaches to mitigating these challenges, a lack of local ownership and, as 
such, ineffective partnerships. Indeed, today there exists widespread confusion among the WMD 
nonproliferation donor community on how to effectively engage Southern countries that – for 
good reasons – do not view the proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons as an 
immediate threat to their societies and the well-being of its citizens. 
 
In this light, it is clear that we need a wider discussion on WMD nonproliferation capacity 
building, which considers the higher priorities of emerging economies and developing regions. In 
short, the next generation WMD nonproliferation regime must include pragmatic programs, 
which simultaneously address local and national priorities in emerging and developing countries, 
with the important mission of preventing the proliferation of WMDs. 
 
 
An East African Case Study in Dual-Benefit Assistance 
 
Solving the problem of bridging the security/development divide, which prevents sustainable 
WMD nonproliferation engagement and programming, begins with understanding the 
overlapping opportunities on issue and pragmatic engagement. In 2012, the Stimson Center 
worked with the Office of the President in the Government of Kenya and a wide range of 
regional experts and organizations, including most prominently the Africa Peace Forum (AFPO) 
as a local partner, in a research program to that end. 
 
Through a series of workshops, seminars and interviews with East African security and 
development experts, a sub-regional list of priorities emerged that included transnational 
organized crime, proliferation of small arms, human and drug trafficking, underdevelopment, 
wildlife crime and terrorist activities. WMD proliferation or the region being used as a 
transshipment point for WMD related materials were notably absent from that agenda. However, 
programming to understand and deal with the issues that the agenda identified shares key aspects 
of WMD nonproliferation capacity building, most notably border security. It was noted that 
building border capacity advances national and international objectives, such as advancing 
security sector reform; strengthening institutions, including police and other law enforcement 
organizations; and the implementation of Kenya’s development blueprint, Kenya Vision 2030, as 
well as international mandates, such as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). 
 
Of course, border security capacity building is a critical component of any strategy to prevent the 
spread of WMD, such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. Recognizing that 
the vast majority of donor resources are currently focused on such issues as WMD 





region would have a dual benefit for the local priorities as well as against global nonproliferation 
efforts. A wide range of overlaps were considered, including: 
 
• Many of the resources required to limit dual-use nuclear products from being trafficked 
throughout Eastern Africa are the same as those needed for the capacity-building 
necessary to combat conventional arms and drug smuggling; 
 
• Assistance with strategic trade controls at national boundaries (land, sea and air) 
promotes efficiencies at transit hubs that in turn facilitates trade expansion and business 
development; and 
 
• Detecting and responding to biological weapons requires sophisticated equipment and 
training that is similar to building a functional disease surveillance network and a public 
health infrastructure. 
 
To that end, the Stimson Center and AFPO began hosting an inter-agency group of Kenyan 
Government stakeholders in charge of a wide range of border strategies. These bi-monthly 
meetings were aimed at understanding the country’s and region’s ability to capitalize on 
assistance and partnerships available across the defense, security and development spheres. It 
was concluded that a more holistic national border security action plan and gap analysis were 
necessary to simultaneously deal with the global WMD nonproliferation agenda and local softer 
security and development challenges. An inter-agency group was formally created and chaired 
out of the Office of the President. Its mission was to improve the internal processes for building 
and maintaining an effective border management process to the benefit of efficient trade and 
development, as well as security objectives, including the nonproliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. The Stimson Center followed these efforts from a research and analysis vantage 
point. The underlying idea was that Kenya, through this border security action plan and gap 
analysis, would be able to partner with a wider group of donors – including those focused on 
WMD nonproliferation – in achieving its border security objectives. As such, a more holistic and 
sustainable WMD nonproliferation approach would emerge. 
 
The vision identified behind this project was that modern nonproliferation mechanisms, such as 
UN Security Council Resolution 1540, could dually prevent the spread of WMDs as well as 









A Border Security Action Plan and Gap Analysis Emerge 
 
Following the preliminary work in identifying security and development agendas and overlaps in 
capacity building, project partners engaged a wide range of Kenyan security and development 





pull together the multiple border security action plans and gap analyses that already existed 
within the Government of Kenya and synthesize them into one guiding strategy and call for 
partnerships. This would result in better national coordination and assistance opportunities. 
Simultaneously as this process was ongoing in Nairobi, the Stimson Center reached out to a 
dozen border security related agencies in several countries to survey how WMD nonproliferation 
programming could further other such initiatives. It was important that initiatives throughout 
emerging and developing parts of the world were also informed by the plethora of capacity 
building strategies that exist throughout the Global North. 
 
The work throughout 2013 culminated in a series of workshops attended by a wide range of 
Kenyan ministries, which reached as many as 15 entities during certain sessions. These 
workshops finalized the border security action plan that emphasized a holistic strategy to the 
benefit of the following objectives: 
 
• An administrative framework that facilitates economic development; 
 
• Prevention of entry of terrorists and criminals and obstructing their activities; 
 
• Prevention of illicit trafficking in small arms, drugs and people; 
 
• Reduction in poaching and smuggling of all items prohibited under the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species in Flora and Fauna (CITES); 
 
• Prevention of WMD and related materials and equipment from being transferred or 
transshipped on Kenyan territory; and 
 
• Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in 
collaboration with the 1540 Committee.‡ 
 
As can be seen, the exercise conceptualized that border insecurity poses a central threat to 
Kenya’s higher priority national interests, as well as to the global WMD nonproliferation regime. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the plan noted advanced opportunities for partnership with the 
donor community resulting in the recognition of these shared interests. The gap analysis 
presented pragmatic capacity building opportunities. 
 
 
Key Components of a Holistic Border Security Action Plan 
 
The Kenyan border security action plan is designed to integrate existing border action strategies 
across multiple stakeholder communities within the Government of Kenya. It identifies strengths 
and weaknesses with regard to Kenyan resources to implement a robust border management 
model, with focus on its economy, population and infrastructure networks. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‡ The basic framework for this plan can be found as an Annex to this paper. Because of the sensitive nature of border 
security capacity building and because some parts of this plan are under review by the Government of Kenya, the 
Annex represents the broad strokes of the plan. The reader should consider the Annex as a framework for analysis, 






The inter-agency group leading the work also identified a wide range of actors with shared 
interest in border security cooperation, including the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of 
National Government, Kenya Police Service, Administration Police Service, Immigration, Kenya 
National Focal Point on Small Arms & Light Weapons, National Steering Committee on 
Peacebuilding & Conflict Management, National Treasury, Kenya Revenue Authority 
(Customs), Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, Kenya Defense Force, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, Kenya Bureau of Standards, Kenya Ports 
Authority, Kenyan Wildlife Services, National Intelligence Service, Kenya Civil Aviation 
Authority, Kenya Airports Authority, Kenya Maritime Authority, Department of Refugee 
Affairs, Agency of Port Health, Weights & Measures, and County Government Departments. 
 
Key capabilities and border components were also thoroughly examined, including surveillance, 
detection and assessment, interdiction, disposition, sanctions, emergency response, deterrence, 
various institution, legal, infrastructure frameworks, technology integration, personnel, 
equipment and partnerships. 
 
In one particular data collection instance associated with the gap analysis in the southern part of 
Kenya, a 2-year bottom-up technological and training approach was recognized as an advisable 
modus operandi. A team of technical experts as well as law enforcement government authorities 
conducted a feasibility study in a specific border security context and determined the 
infrastructure and training needs required for a holistic and sustainable border security solution. 
The first step of this exercise was to identify the border parameter, entrance/intrusion points and 
key areas of vulnerability, critical protection areas, current level of, for example, training and 
equipment among law enforcement personnel and coordination with other law enforcement 
agencies. From that baseline a layered border security system was designed and a timeline for 
implementation stretching over two years. 
 
This gap analysis exercise determined that capacity building is mainly a matter of selecting the 
right technological and training combination to give an adequate level of situational awareness, 
and to deploy the systems gradually in the right order. This is a major challenge in Kenya today 
when it comes to the donor community offering border security assistance. A key point identified 
is to integrate all technology in one surveillance system they can operate on a desktop computer. 
 
In a first step, the surveillance system can keep track of the law enforcement personnel and 
vehicles using GPS through a secure software platform including analytics functions. It can also 
assist in logging the position of intrusion attempts or irregularities during law enforcement daily 
patrolling. The second step would entail integrating unmanned ground sensor networks and 
radars to detect and track dangerous technologies and intruders. Training is of high importance in 
this phase, and a surveillance system can also be used to simulate different scenarios for the 
purpose of preparing the law enforcement offices for different situations while simultaneously 
training them to operate the new technology. 
 
This part of the gap analysis determined that today, the technologically most advanced 
equipment may not be the right way to start because of inadequate levels of training on how to 






Pragmatic Implementation Opportunities: UN Security Council Resolution 1540 as a 
Platform 
 
Over the course of the year, members of the working group and other project partners were 
invited to speak at a wide range of WMD nonproliferation and security/development conferences 
organized by donor countries and multilateral organizations. These experiences led to the 
realization that UN Security Council Resolution 1540 represents a good platform for 
implementing components of the then-emerging border security strategy. Resolution 1540 is a 
newer WMD nonproliferation platform and was a reaction to the 2004 revelation that A.Q. Khan 
was able to establish a sophisticated proliferation network that spread WMD technology 
throughout the world. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 in April 
2004 and mandated that all member states implement a set of supply-side controls related to the 
nonproliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Criminalization and enforcement 
provisions vis-à-vis proliferant activities within national territories are also key components of 
Resolution 1540. Specifically, this legally binding resolution calls upon states to: 
 
• Adopt and enforce laws that prohibit any non-state actor from manufacturing, acquiring, 
possessing, developing, transporting, transferring, or using nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons and their means of delivery; 
 
• Develop and maintain measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, 
storage or transport; 
 
• Develop and maintain effective physical protection measures; 
 
• Develop and maintain effective border controls and law-enforcement efforts to detect, 
deter, prevent and combat illicit trafficking; 
 
• Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and 
transshipment controls over such items. 
 
While targeting the spread of WMD to non-state actors, the provisions of Resolution 1540 have a 
myriad of applications that can counter a wide range of other security and development 
challenges as noted in the graph below. It is this recognition that will lead to more inclusive 
security and development partnerships that benefit both the WMD nonproliferation regime and 
the higher priorities of emerging and developing countries. The Kenyan border security action 
plan noting of Resolution 1540 as a platform for partnership is an important realization. Indeed, 
the content of that action is in many regards very well synchronized with several provisions of 
Resolution 1540. As such, there are ample opportunities for countries to work together on both 
building a robust WMD nonproliferation environment in Kenya and achieving that country’s 
higher priority security goals. It is now up to the WMD donor community and the Government 










Further Research Opportunities 
 
More extensive research and analysis are necessary to better understand how WMD 
nonproliferation financial, technical and human resources can dually assist local security and 
development agendas throughout the Global South. Only with that model can the global 
community build a nonproliferation regime that is valuable to countries that face a wide variety 
of security challenges and are in various stages of societal development. 
 
Regional efforts could be particularly helpful due to the transnational nature of many of the 
threats that the world is facing	  today. A continued focus on East Africa – seen as a current and 
potentially further emerging transshipment area for dangerous technologies – and border security 
could significantly advance our understanding on how to build a truly global 21st century 
nonproliferation regime that takes into consideration a more complex security and development 
landscape. 
 
Indeed, East Africa and border security capacity building remain good research targets to 
extrapolate broader lessons on modern security and development capacity building that will 
simultaneously benefit the WMD nonproliferation agenda and local priorities. First, there is a 
growing threat in the region from transnational militant organizations like the al Qaeda affiliated 
al Shabaab, which easily moves across national boundaries and successfully carries out terrorist 
attacks. Second, US policymakers and elected officials have noted the elevated threats stemming 
from ungoverned territories, insufficient capacity – including border capacity – and increased 







Third, border insecurity is a critical piece of the WMD nonproliferation puzzle in East Africa. 
Importantly, border security is also central to achieving higher priority security and development 
objectives. For example, porous borders facilitate the smuggling of arms, drugs, humans, wildlife 
and counterfeit goods, which are key sources of income for terrorist organizations and 
transnational organized criminals in East Africa. 
 
A research agenda should examine the following key areas: 
 
• Surveys of East African national border security strategies and ongoing capacity building 
projects; 
 
• Analysis of how these strategies and projects correspond with the breadth of US and 
international WMD nonproliferation programming that is focused on the countries in 
question; 
 
• Identification of pragmatic “dual-benefit” assistance that aids local priorities, as well as 
the WMD nonproliferation agenda; 
 
A more sophisticated understanding will help build a sustainable WMD nonproliferation agenda 








Border Security Action Plan§ 
 
 
1.0. Introduction: Security and Development Challenges Resulting from Border Insecurity 
 
The Government of Kenya recognizes that border insecurity poses a central threat to its critical 
national interests. Porous international boundaries significantly challenge our national, 
economic, social and political objectives, as laid out in Vision 2030. The vision aims at 
transforming Kenya into an industrialized middle-income country providing a high quality of life 
to all Kenyans by 2030.  
 
The current state of insecurity along Kenya’s international borders facilitates a wide range of 
challenges that directly impinge upon Kenya’s ability to meet these objectives. The challenges 
range from terrorism to piracy, influx of refugees, proliferation of illicit trafficking in small 
arms, drugs and people, as well as poaching and the smuggling of goods. Insecure borders help 
promote criminality related to armed conflict, which in turn negatively impacts national 
development.  
 
Kenya’s vast and porous international boundaries, therefore, can have significant implications on 
regional and international peace and security.  If inadequately managed, criminals can exploit 
security gaps to plan and execute criminal activities worldwide. 
 
In the worst case scenario, porous international borders can further the likelihood that non-state 
actors acquire chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons (WMD) that, if used, would 
have adverse political, economic and social consequences worldwide.  
 
Enhanced border security is a bridge to both development and security, neither of which can be 
achieved without the other.  The Government of Kenya is committed to meeting all of its 
national and international obligations with a view to contributing to global peace and prosperity.  
  
The Government of Kenya Border Security Action Plan envisages securing and managing its 
territorial boundaries (air, land and sea) by ensuring:  
 
• An administrative framework that facilitates economic development; 
• Prevention of entry of terrorists and criminals and obstructing their activities; 
• Prevention of illicit trafficking in small arms, drugs and people; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
§	  Stimson primarily assisted AFPO and Government of Kenya stakeholders with providing a framework for analysis 
by engaging with a wide range of border security experts from key donor states. Stimson also surveyed and 
identified a wide range of WMD nonproliferation assistance opportunities based on these local border efforts. Local 
actors were responsible for providing content from within their own area of responsibility, including generating a 
gap analysis. Because border security capacity building is sensitive in nature, the plan in this Annex communicates 






• Reduction in poaching and smuggling of all items prohibited under Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species in Flora and Fauna (CITES); 
• Prevention of WMD and related materials and equipment from being transferred or 
transshipped on Kenyan territory; and 
• Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in 
collaboration with 1540 Committee.  
 
In order to achieve the above, the Government of Kenya is committed to working with all sectors 
of Kenyan society, as well as its neighbors and the international community.   
 
Kenya Border Security Action Plan (BSAP) is therefore designed to integrate existing border 
action strategies across multiple stakeholder communities within the Government of Kenya.   
 
2.0. Border Security Resources: Strength and Weaknesses 
 
There are a number of categories of resources that Kenya can leverage for border security. 
 
Economy 
Kenya serves as a regional hub for trade and finance in East Africa – the Horn of Africa and 
Great Lakes region. Kenya has well-developed infrastructures, road and railway networks, sea 
ports, airports, communication networks and skilled human resources. Kenya has a great 
potential for natural resource exploitation. Based on 2012 World Bank data, Kenya’s population 
has a population size of  43.18 M with $40.70 billion GDP and a 5 percent real growth rate.  The 
country’s leading industries include small-scale consumer goods production, agriculture, 
horticulture, oil refining, metals, cement, commercial ship repair and tourism. Kenya’s main 
commodity exports are primarily agricultural, including tea and coffee. Natural resources in the 
country include wildlife, soda ash, land and some mineral resources. 
 
Regionally, Kenya is pursuing economic integration under the umbrella of East African 
Community (EAC). Kenya maintains relations with its neighbors, although it bears a significant 
burden from the instability in Somalia.   
 
Population 
Kenya has a young population; 42.5 percent of the population is under 15 years old. Out of 
Kenya’s estimated 43 million people, the labor force is an estimated 18.39 million with a 40% 
unemployment rate. The literacy rate for the total population over the age of 15 is 87.4 percent. 
 
Networks 
Of a total 160,966 km of roadways in the country, 149,689 km are unpaved. Kenya’s major 
seaport is the port of Mombasa, with a second Port of Lamu undergoing development to serve 
both South Sudan and Ethiopia (LAPPSSET). The Kenyan Port Authority operates inland 
container depots in both the capital city Nairobi and the city of Kisumu, located on the shores of 
Lake Victoria, that are connected to the port of Mombasa by rail. Kenya has relatively high 
mobile phone usage with an estimated 29.9 million users in 2012. There are a large number of 





in 2012 Kenyan internet users increased by 95.63% to 17.38 m compared to 8.89 m users in the 
previous year.   
 
3.0. Border Security Framework: Actors, Capabilities, Component 
 
Border Security Actors  
 
The Government of Kenya is committed to a holistic Border Security Action Plan.  The 
following actors within the Kenyan Government are part of fulfilling this Action Plan. 
 
• Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government 
- Kenya Police Service  
- Administration Police Service  
- Immigration 
- Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms & Light Weapons (KNFP) 
- National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding & Conflict Management (NSC) 
• National Treasury/Finance 
• Kenya Revenue Authority (Customs) 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs& International Trade  
• Kenya Defence Force (KDF)  
• Agriculture ( Fisheries, Kephis, Livestock, Veterinary )  
• Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure 
• Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) 
• Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) 
• Kenyan Wildlife Services (KWS) 
• National Intelligence Service (NIS) 
• Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) 
• Kenya Airports Authority (KAA) 
• Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) 
• Department of Refugee Affairs  
• Agency of Port Health  
• Weights & Measures  
• County Government Departments  
• Local Communities  
 
Border Security Capabilities  
 
The Government of Kenya recognizes the following seven critical capabilities in order to execute 
the Border Security Action Plan:  
 
• Surveillance 
The capability to obtain knowledge about everything that is moving across a border 
through visual or other means 
 
• Detection and Assessment 







The capability, once a commodity or person of concern is detected, to engage and 
neutralize the threat 
  
• Disposition 
The capability to control, confine or otherwise secure the individual or commodity 
  
• Sanctions 
The capability to take action against cargo or persons  
  
• Emergency Response 
The capability to appropriately respond to emergency circumstances, such as search and 
rescue and other life/safety situations 
 
• Deterrence 
The capability to dissuade or deter illicit activity 
 
Border Security Components  
 
The Government of Kenya prioritizes the following seven critical capabilities and components in 
order to execute the Border Security Action Plan: 
 
• Institutional Framework  
The governance, the authority and organization that provides the legal justification and 
chain of command for conducting border security operations 
 
• Legal Framework 
Comprehensive laws and regulations that prohibit certain activities and designate 
authorities for surveillance, search and seizure, use of force, detention, prosecution and 
punishment.  
 
• Infrastructure  
Provides the backbone which supports all the other components and includes physical 
barriers and outposts, power lines and roads, supply systems and security 
 
• Technology Integration  
Includes all methods of passing information across the border security force from voice 
radios to digital data streams. Effective technology integration is required for 
synchronizing actions and employing dispersed resources: Inclusion of the 
communication equipment  
 
• Personnel  
Highly trained professionals that possess integrity, excellent cognitive skills and the 






• Equipment  
Material that provides enhanced capability to the border officials 
 
• Partnerships 
Cooperative agreements for achieving border security objectives, including agreements 
with neighbor governments, national agencies, private sector organizations, local 
communities and other stakeholders 
